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Primary Source · Brahma Sutra 2.2 (Thibaut)
Thibaut’s English rendering of the sūtras, SBE 34 (1890). Cite as Brahma Sutra 2.2.1 (Thibaut). The commentary of Śaṅkara is Advaita Vedanta and is not hosted in full on this page.
Sūtra 11 is not marked as a separate numbered heading in the Project Gutenberg transcription of SBE 34 (eBook #16295) used here. The full commentary can be read in that eBook. This page does not invent a wording for the missing heading.
That which is inferred (by the Saṅkhyas, viz. the pradhana) cannot be the cause (of the world), on account of the orderly arrangement (of the world) being impossible (on that hypothesis).
And on account of (the impossibility of) activity.
If it be said (that the pradhana moves) like milk or water, (we reply that) there also (the motion is due to intelligence).
And because (the pradhana), on account of there existing nothing beyond it, stands in no relation; (it cannot be active.)
Nor (can it be said that the pradhana modifies itself spontaneously) like grass, &c. (which turn into milk); for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (but in the female animal).
Even if we admit (the Saṅkhya position refuted in what precedes, it is invalidated by other objections) on account of the absence of a purpose (on the part of the pradhana).
And if you say (that the soul may move the pradhana) as the (lame) man (moves the blind one) or as the magnet (moves the iron); thus also (the difficulty is not overcome).
And, again, (the pradhana cannot be active) because the relation of principal (and subordinate matter) is impossible (between the three gunas).
And although another inference be made, (the objections remain in force) on account of the (pradhana) being devoid of the power of intelligence.
And moreover (the Saṅkhya doctrine) is objectionable on account of its contradictions.
In both cases also (in the cases of the adrishta inhering either in the atoms or the soul) action (of the atoms) is not (possible); hence absence of that (viz. creation and pralaya).
And because in consequence of samavaya being admitted a regressus in infinitum results from parity of reasoning.
And on account of the permanent existence (of activity or non-activity).
And on account of the atoms having colour, &c., the reverse (of the Vaiseshika tenet would take place); as thus it is observed.
And as there are difficulties in both cases.
And as the (atomic theory) is not accepted (by any authoritative persons) it is to be disregarded altogether.
(If there be assumed) the (dyad of) aggregates with its two causes, (there takes place) non-establishment of those (two aggregates).
If it be said that (the formation of aggregates may be explained) through (Nescience, &c.) standing in the relation of mutual causality; we say 'No,' because they merely are the efficient causes of the origin (of the immediately subsequent links).
(Nor can there be a causal relation between Nescience, &c.), because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one ceases to be.
On the supposition of there being no (cause: while yet the effect takes place), there results contradiction of the admitted principle; otherwise simultaneousness (of cause and effect).
Cessation dependent on a sublative act of the mind, and cessation not so dependent cannot be established, there being no (complete) interruption.
And on account of the objections presenting themselves in either case.
And in the case of space also (the doctrine of its being a non-entity is untenable) on account of its not differing (from the two other kinds of non-entity).
And on account of remembrance.
(Entity) does not spring from non-entity on account of that not being observed.
And thus (on that doctrine) there would be an accomplishment (of ends) in the case of non-active people also.
The non-existence (of external things) cannot be maintained, on account of (our) consciousness (of them).
And on account of their difference of nature (the ideas of the waking state) are not like those of a dream.
The existence (of mental impressions) is not possible on the Bauddha view, on account of the absence of perception (of external things).
And on account of the momentariness (of the alayavijnana, it cannot be the abode of mental impressions).
And on account of its general deficiency in probability.
On account of the impossibility (of contradictory attributes) in one thing, (the Jaina doctrine is) not (to be accepted).
And likewise (there results from the Jaina, doctrine) non-universality of the Self.
Nor is non-contradiction to be derived from the succession (of parts acceding to and departing from the soul), on account of the change, &c. (of the soul).
And on account of the permanency of the final (size of the soul) and the resulting permanency of the two (preceding sizes) there is no difference (of size, at any time).
The Lord (cannot be the cause of the world), on account of the inappropriateness (of that doctrine).
And on account of the impossibility of the connexion (of the Lord with the souls and the pradhana).
And on account of the impossibility of rulership (on the part of the Lord).
If you say that as the organs (are ruled by the soul so the pradhana is ruled by the Lord), we deny that on account of the enjoyment, &c.
And (there would follow from that doctrine) either finite duration or absence of omniscience (on the Lord's part).
On account of the impossibility of the origination (of the individual soul from the highest Lord, the doctrine of the Bhagavatas cannot be accepted).
And (it is) not (observed that) the instrument is produced from the agent.
Or (if) in consequence of the existence of knowledge, &c. (Vasudeva, &c. be taken as Lords), yet there is non-exclusion of that (i.e. the objection raised in Sutra 42).
And on account of contradictions.